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I. CODE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 
Law No. 19747 of April 19, 2019 introduced several important 
amendments to the Code of Children and Adolescents (Law 
No. 17823 of September 7, 2004), especially to articles 117 to 131. 
One of these amendments has been the change in the title of Section 
I, Chapter IX, now entitled “Protection of Children’s and Adoles-
cents’ Threatened or Violated Rights.” 
The amendments, in keeping with the Code’s objective of pro-
tecting children and adolescents, provide that: 
in administrative and court proceedings for the redress of 
threatened or violated rights, every child or adolescent has a 
right to: (a) be treated with dignity, considering their age and 
their special circumstances; (b) have their opinion, needs, 
and expectations taken into particular account, regardless of 
their age, with a view to the actual protection of their rights, 
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observing the principle of progressive autonomy whenever 
appropriate; (c) not to be discriminated against based on sex, 
age, ethnic origin, race, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
financial or social position, disability, or place of origin or 
residence; (d) be assisted and represented by a lawyer; (e) be 
always accompanied by an adult whom they trust; (f) have 
their private life, identity, and privacy respected; (g) be in-
formed about the progress of the proceedings and the possi-
ble outcome; (h) receive full redress for any damage, by or-
dering the relevant agencies to take certain steps and actions 
to make up for the rights violated, including, without limita-
tion, the treatment and rehabilitation of their psychological 
and physical health. 
These provisions apply to children and adolescents whose rights 
provided for in general terms under the Code of Children and Ado-
lescents have been threatened or violated. An example of this ap-
proach is article 8, which provides that their opinions and prefer-
ences must be considered and that they must be heard in all matters 
in which they are involved. Another example is article 15(b), which 
provides for the protection against any form of discrimination. 
Article 120(2), in its new wording, provides: “Children and ad-
olescents must be represented by lawyers. Children’s and adoles-
cents’ opinions, as well as the opinions of legal representatives or 
persons in charge of their care, must be heard, paying special atten-
tion to expert reports.” 
Also, the new wording of article 119 of the Code provides:  
Notwithstanding other responsibilities inherent in the posi-
tion, counsel for children and adolescents shall: (a) interview 
the child or adolescent at the outset of their relationship to 
learn about their situation, opinion, and needs; (b) inform 
and assist the child or adolescent regarding their rights; (c) 
hear and consider the child’s or adolescent’s opinion in all 
stages of the proceedings and especially when taking deci-
sions which directly affect their living conditions; (d) file 
any legal actions necessary to reestablish, protect, and en-
force the rights of the child or adolescent; (e) seek and take 
into account the opinions of professionals and other experts 
who have knowledge of or have taken part in the matter so 
that their representation be consistent with the individual 




characteristics of the child or adolescent and their family and 
social context. 
Article 120.1 provides for the application of the court-ordered 
and administrative measures involving children or adolescents es-
tablished under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
was adopted in the Uruguayan legal order through Law No. 16137 
of September 28, 1990. Article 120.1, in keeping with the Conven-
tion, clarifies that the following steps will be especially considered: 
(a) preventing discrimination based on gender, age, ethnic or racial 
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and social and financial 
situation; (b) promoting life free from gender-based or domestic vi-
olence; (c) ensuring strict respect for the best interests of the child. 
Article 120.4 includes a nonexhaustive list of steps that may be 
taken to protect beneficiaries: (a) registering the child or adolescent 
in the education system; (b) registering the child or adolescent in 
other education or recreational institutions; (c) providing healthcare 
treatment in coordination with government-funded and private 
healthcare services; (d) participating in financial-support programs; 
(e) participating in family-support programs with the Uruguayan In-
stitute of Children and Adolescents (in their own family, in the ex-
tended family, or in a family that secures their development); (f) 
warning parents or other caregivers so that they address or prevent 
the threat or violation of the rights of children or adolescents under 
their care and demanding the performance of all obligations they 
have to protect any affected rights; (g) securing temporary social 
and family orientation, support, and follow-up provided by recog-
nized government-sponsored or private programs; (h) providing 
outpatient, medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment in gov-
ernment-funded or private healthcare institutions; (i) taking any 
other steps which benefit the comprehensive development of the 
child or adolescent. Also, it is established that the court must state 
the individual or agency responsible for taking those steps, and this 
will be supervised by specialized teams created for that purpose. 




In addition to the steps described above, the law provides for the 
possibility that the child or adolescent whose right to life or physical 
integrity is seriously threatened may be placed under the care of a 
family selected by the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adoles-
cents which undertakes to provide comprehensive protection (article 
120.5). 
Under article 120.6, all children and adolescents have the right 
to voluntarily access 24-hour treatment, care, and accommodation 
programs. If the parents or caregivers challenge this, without preju-
dice to the immediate adoption of measures to protect the right of 
children and adolescents, the court with competent jurisdiction will 
make the final decision, considering the opinion and the best inter-
ests of the child or adolescent. 
The institutionalization of children or adolescents against their 
will shall only be adopted by court decision based on specialized 
opinions by experts in the matter, as the last resort, and whenever it 
is essential to preserve the life or integrity of the children and ado-
lescents in question. The maximum institutionalization term shall be 
for thirty days, which may be extended for periods of the same du-
ration (article 120.7). 
In articles 123 et seq. of the Code of Children and Adolescents, 
under the title “Measures Against Sexual Violence and Abuse,” sev-
eral options are given to protect the beneficiaries of these measures. 
Article 123 provides:  
Sexual violence or abuse against children or adolescents 
means any kind of physical, psychical, or humiliating harm, 
damage, or punishment, negligent disregard or treatment, 
sexual abuse or exploitation in any modality, occurring 
within the family, in an institution, or in the community. 
Abuse against children and adolescents also includes their 
exposure to gender-based violence against their mothers or 
other caregivers. 
To protect children and adolescents, all precautionary measures 
may be taken which are intended to terminate any sexual-violence 
abuse situation, to prevent any possible retaliation or threats, and to 




ensure the permanence of the child or adolescent with family mem-
bers whenever possible. For that purpose, all measures considered 
under article 10 of Law No. 17514 of July 2, 2002, aimed at elimi-
nating all forms of domestic violence, may be taken, especially the 
following: (a) restricting the alleged perpetrator from communi-
cating, being in contact with, interviewing, or in any other way ac-
cessing the alleged victim or the person who reported the event; (b) 
granting the provisional custody of the child or adolescent to close 
relatives or any other persons with whom the child or adolescent has 
a good relationship; (c) provisionally ordering any persons who are 
under the obligation to pay child support to do so; (d) ordering the 
removal of the alleged perpetrator from the common home, if any; 
(e) referring the matter to the Uruguayan Institute of Children and 
Adolescents. Any such measures shall be ordered without prejudice 
to any other measures that the court with competent authority on 
criminal matters may order with respect to the alleged perpetrator. 
II. CHANGES INTRODUCED BY LAW REQUIRING URGENT DEBATE 
NO. 19889 OF JULY 9, 2020 
The 2019 Uruguay general elections produced a change in pres-
idential administration, as well as the election of new members to 
the Senate (31 members) and House of Representatives (99 mem-
bers). As none of the candidates for president obtained a majority of 
votes in the general election held on October 27, 2019, a presidential 
runoff took place in November between the two tickets that had re-
ceived the most votes (i.e., the Frente Amplio, which ran on a left-
wing platform and had been in office since 2005, and the Partido 
Nacional, which ran on a conservative platform). The Partido 
Nacional obtained the majority in the run-off, and Luis Lacalle Pou 
became president for the 2020–2025 term. Lacalle now governs with 
the legislative support of the so-called Coalición Multicolor (Multi-
color Coalition), which includes the Partido Nacional (also known 
as Partido Blanco) as well as the Partido Colorado, the Partido 




Cabildo Abierto, the Partido de la Gente, and the Partido Inde-
pendiente. 
After the electoral victory, the president-elect promoted the 
adoption of new legislation requiring “urgent debate” by Congress, 
with the purpose of streamlining the exercise of his office. That 
piece of legislation, passed by both legislative chambers with the 
support of the Multicolor Coalition, was ultimately signed into law 
on July 9, 2020 as Law No. 19889.  
This new law amends many aspects of the Uruguayan legal or-
der: public safety, education, payment systems, among others. Be-
low is a comment of the main changes in the realm of private law, 
including adoption, leases, and prescription. 
A. Changes in Adoption 
The Uruguayan Code of Children and Adolescents (CCT) was 
originally enacted as Law No. 17823 of September 7, 2004 and has 
been amended multiple times. Changes to the adoption laws had al-
ready been introduced by Laws Nos. 18590 of September 18, 2009 
and 19092 of June 17, 2013, both of whose provisions had been in-
corporated into the CCT.  
Now, Law No. 19889, in articles 403 to 406, has incorporated 
several new amendments relative to the adoption regime. 
The Uruguayan adoption system provides for the decisive role 
of the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents (Instituto 
del Niño y Adolescente del Uruguay, INAU). This institute was orig-
inally tasked with selecting adopting families; any other way of 
choosing the adopting family was null.  
Law No. 19889 maintains INAU’s important role in the Uru-
guayan adoption system, but the tendency of the legislation is to 
weaken its primacy to some extent. A new article 132.6, CCT, pro-
vides that when the court orders the placement of a child or adoles-
cent with a family, whether temporarily or within a definitive sepa-
ration process, the family shall be selected by INAU. The court may 




only depart from INAU’s selection if it provides reasons, which 
must have support from the social workers of the Judiciary, the Fo-
rensic Technical Institute, and other experts of the family courts 
with specialized jurisdiction. In any such case, the court shall ask 
that the INAU experts make a new selection in the same terms and 
with the same conditions as in the first case. The most important 
change is that the court may now ignore the selection made by the 
experts of the INAU Adoptions Department. In this case, the court 
shall issue an exceptional decision with grounds when the child or 
adolescent is fully integrated in a family, having generated so sig-
nificant bonds that cutting such bonds would entail a violation of the 
child’s or adolescent’s rights, provided that the custody has been 
lawful from the beginning, always prioritizing the best interests of 
the child or adolescent in the case. In these cases, the court shall 
require social and psychological reports from INAU experts or the 
Judiciary. After obtaining favorable reports, at the discretion of the 
court, the parties may file for the definitive separation and full adop-
tion. The law establishes that if there are any siblings in the same 
condition, all efforts shall be made so that they are jointly adopted. 
B. Changes in Leases and Evictions 
Articles 421 to 459, Law No. 19889 incorporate into the Uru-
guayan legal order a new regime for the lease of properties destined 
to habitation. The key feature of this regime is that the lessee is not 
required to present any kind of security for the performance of their 
obligations.  
The new regime is added to the one established under Decree-
Law No. 14219 of July 4, 1974, which is still in force, albeit with 
multiple amendments since its enactment.  
The new law also provides that evictions in leases of properties 
without any security are subject to substantially shorter terms than 
the ones in force in the ordinary regime. 




For the contract to fall within the new Law No. 19889, the fol-
lowing requirements need to be met: (a) the property must be used 
primarily for habitation, although it is permissible to manage a small 
household business, not exceeding two employees, as well as prac-
tice a profession requiring a university degree or similar qualifica-
tion, on the premises, provided that such activities do not adversely 
affect the neighborhood by creating emissions, vibrations, annoying 
noise, and do not cause damage to the property, and providing that 
the activity complies with any municipal regulations; (b) the con-
tract must not provide for any security of any nature in favor of the 
lessor; (c) the contract must be in writing; (d) the contract must ex-
pressly include the lease term and price; (e) the parties must express 
their will to have the lease agreement regulated by the new law. 
If any of the requirements mentioned above are not met, the pro-
visions of Decree-Law No. 14219 continue to apply, and this means, 
among other things, longer eviction terms than the contract incorpo-
rated in Uruguayan law.  
The rent may be agreed upon in national or foreign currency, or 
in readjustable or indexed units. Unless agreed otherwise, the rent 
shall be due every month and shall be paid within the first ten days 
of each month, at the place and according to the payment method 
agreed upon by the parties. Under no circumstance shall the lessor 
demand more than one month of rent in advance (article 422).  
Under article 427, “unless otherwise provided in the lease agree-
ment, the lessee shall be responsible for the payment of any con-
sumption, common expenses, or services incidental to the lease.” If 
the lessee fails to pay, and the lessor pays two or more months of 
national or municipal taxes, consumption, common expenses or any 
other incidental services whose payment has been provided for un-
der the law or the contract as a responsibility of the lessee, the new 
debt shall be considered indivisible with the existing rent, and the 
lack of payment thereof shall amount to default on the rent itself. 
Article 430 establishes a special summary action for eviction 
based on the expiration of the term in the contract: “the court shall 




order eviction of the property, within thirty days from the day after 
the judgment has been served on the lessee.” Under article 431, the 
lessee shall have six business days to file any defenses. Once the 
eviction order has become final and unappealable and the lease term 
has lapsed, the lessor may at any time demand eviction of the lessee 
who has not surrendered the property voluntarily, which eviction 
shall become effective within fifteen business days from the service 
on the lessee of the eviction order. The eviction term may be ex-
tended only once provided that the request for extension be filed at 
least two business days before the day set for the eviction and the 
lessee provides grounds by authentic means of the existence of an 
event of force majeure. Any such extension cannot exceed seven 
business days. 
If the lessee is evicted for failure to pay, the court shall order the 
eviction with a term of six business days, beginning from the day 
following the day the judgment was served on the lessee (article 
439). After the judgment ordering the eviction becomes final, the 
eviction shall be effective after five business days since the date 
when the judgment has been served on the lessee (article 442). In 
that case, an extension of the eviction may also be prayed for, which 
may only be granted for a term not to exceed five days. 
C. Changes in Prescription 
From the beginning, Uruguayan law has followed the trend in 
other legal systems and identified two kinds of acquisitive prescrip-
tion according to their defining elements: (a) “ordinary” or “abbre-
viated” prescription, and (b) “extraordinary” or “extended” prescrip-
tion.  
Ordinary prescription requires possession, which is the struc-
tural element in any case of acquisitive prescription, along with 
good faith and just title. When these elements are present, prescrip-
tive terms are shorter (before Law No. 19889, three years were 




required for movables and ten or twenty for immovables, depending 
on whether the parties were present or absent persons).  
Extraordinary prescription does not require good faith or just ti-
tle, so the term to acquire ownership by prescription is extended (be-
fore the new law: six years for movables and thirty years for immov-
ables).  
Law No. 19889 did not modify the required terms or conditions 
for acquiring ownership over movables by prescription, but many 
changes were introduced in connection with immovables. These 
were the main changes: 
(a) The possession term for “extraordinary” or “extended” pre-
scription was reduced from 30 to 20 years (current wording of article 
1211, Civil Code, as amended by article 463, Law No. 19889). 
(b) The possession term required to acquire with just title and in 
good faith for the “ordinary” or “abbreviated” prescription is now 
10 years (current article 1204, Civil Code). Based on this change, 
the Uruguayan legal order no longer distinguishes between present 
and absent persons for the purposes of prescription. The old system 
considered whether the person against whom the prescription was 
asserted was located in the country or was abroad. As a result, article 
1205, distinguishing present and absent persons, was repealed. 
(c) Article 467, Law No. 19889 includes a temporary provision 
stating that any prescription actions which had been brought by the 
date when the law became effective would follow the provisions of 
the new law. It is also provided, however, that any prescriptions 
which are running which, due to the reductions established by the 
law, have run or shall run before the two-year term since the date 
stated in the section above, shall only run after such term finishes.  
Another change was the amendment of article 1206, Civil Code, 
regarding “accession” of possessions: “The current possessor may 
complete the term needed for prescription, adding to their posses-
sion the possession of the previous owner of that thing, by universal 
or particular title, onerously, provided that both have started to pos-
sess in good faith.” That provision was a source of doubt for 




doctrinal authors, specifically regarding whether or not it was appli-
cable only to the abbreviated prescription or also to the extended 
prescription. A third section was added to the article, according to 
which that provision is only applicable to ordinary or abbreviated 
prescription, and not extraordinary or extended prescription. There-
fore, to cumulate the possessions of the multiple possessors to ac-
quire ownership by prescription, in the case of extended acquisitive 
prescription, there is no need for all to start possessing in good faith, 
i.e., with the belief that the person who transmits the possession is 
the owner. 
Other changes include amendments to articles 1151, 1215, and 
1216 of the Civil Code. 
Under the new article 1150(1), “The action to demand the parti-
tion of the inheritance expires after twenty years against the coheir 
who has possessed the entirety or part of the inheritance in their own 
name or as the sole owner.” It is clear that the provision, which used 
to require a thirty-year term, now allows a party to ask for the parti-
tion of an inheritance (even if the provision applies to any kind of 
indivision) up and until the time when the coheir who has inher-
itance property acquires such property by prescription. The logic un-
derlying the reduction of the term is clear: as the terms for extended 
prescription of immovables were reduced, the term to request the 
partition was reduced accordingly. 
Under the new article 1215, Civil Code, “Any real action pre-
scribes after twenty years,” which significantly reduces the term, as 
the term used to be thirty years. However, the provision makes an 
express exception from that term with respect to servitudes, which 
are extinguished by nonuse for ten years (article 643(2)) and when 
acquisitive prescription has run, in which the action to recover the 
possession of the thing from which the owner was deprived, ceases 
after the term has run for the prescription of the thing (articles 1204, 
1212, and 1214, Civil Code). 
At the same time, the new wording of article 1216(1), in con-
nection with the extinctive prescription of credit rights, establishes 




that “Any personal action for a debt due prescribes after ten years, 
without prejudice to any specific provisions of special laws.” This 
provision reduces by a half the twenty-year term that Uruguayan law 
used to require. 
D. Other Amendments to the Civil Code 
Law No. 19889 introduced two changes in the law of succession. 
First, article 809(9), Civil Code, was repealed. This section had pro-
vided that “persons who are not domiciled in the Department” could 
serve as witnesses to a testament. As the article did not detail 
whether the domicile referred to was that of the testator or the place 
where the testament was executed, the choice was made to repeal 
the provision.  
Article 462, Law No. 19889 amends article 1075, Civil Code, 
which is about the express renunciation of the inheritance. The pro-
vision stated: “An inheritance must be renounced by notarial record 
executed by a civil-law notary of the domicile of the renouncing 
party or of the deceased.” The new wording no longer requires that 
the notarial record be executed by a civil-law notary of any of these 
domiciles, so the record may be executed by any civil-law notary of 
the country, regardless of their domicile. 
Article 1561 was also amended by the new law—now, the article 
adopts a unanimous position in the doctrine, which embraced an in-
terpretation contrary to the provisions of the legal text. The provi-
sion on the absolute nullity established that “absolute nullity cannot 
be cured by the parties’ ratification or by a lapse of less than thirty 
years.” However, commentators believed that the nullity could not 
be cured even by a lapse of thirty years or more, although during 
that term the thing that was intended to be acquired through an ab-
solutely null contract could still be acquired through acquisitive pre-
scription. As a consequence of the changes made, the last part of 
article 1561, Civil Code, now provides that absolute nullity “cannot 
be cured.” 
